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学术讲座预告:“厦门大学会计学科教师与研究生系列Seminar”之七十

责任编辑:刘银燕  发布时间:2020-10-16 16:48:26   点击次数:


为了活跃厦门大学会计学科的学术研究氛围,激发既有教师与在校研究生的学术研究热情和积极性,促进教师之间、教师与研究生之间、研究生彼此之间的深入交流、思想碰撞与知识分享,我们组织了由厦门大学会计学科的常任教师、博()士研究生、国际访问学者等作为报告人的系列Seminar。该Seminar将冠以“厦门大学会计学科教师与研究生系列Seminar”的总标题,从2017314日起,每周周二/周五下午15:00-17:30举行。该Seminar与已有的“财务、会计Seminar(主要聘请校外与境外的学者担任报告人) 相互补充,以期能够更好地推动厦门大学会计学科的学术发展。

 

题  目:Multiple Directorships and Audit Committee Effectiveness: Evidence from Effort Allocation

报告人:郑 祯 助理教授

主持人:刘馨茗 助理教授

时  间:20201023日(星期五),15:00-17:30

地  点:嘉庚一409

论文摘要:Recent post-SOX studies have consistently found that the presence of audit committee (AC) directors with multiple directorships is associated with lower financial reporting quality. One major problem with these studies is that they implicitly assume that AC directors distribute their effort equally across all directorships. Using firm size (which proxies for reputation incentives) and risk of litigation and misstatements (which proxy for risk incentives) as measures of relative directorship importance, we investigate (1) how AC directors serving in multiple directorships allocate their effort to different directorships, and (2) whether the unequal prioritization of effort across multiple directorships affects AC monitoring effectiveness. We find a positive (no) association between the risk-based (firm-size-based) directorship importance measure and AC effectiveness, suggesting that AC directors serving on multiple boards unequally allocate their effort to different directorships and risk incentives appear to outweigh reputation incentives in their effort allocation. Our results are robust to controlling for endogeneity.