题 目：Non-GAAP Earnings and Stock Price Crash Risk
论文摘要：Prior research concludes that stock price crash risk is primarily attributable to managers’ withholding of bad news from investors. We extend this literature by investigating whether crash risk can also occur when managers disclose additional information via non-GAAP reporting, which downplays reported bad news by re-directing investors’ attention to other, more positive aspects of performance. We find that the likelihood of crash risk is higher when managers have reported non-GAAP earnings more frequently during the past year. We also find that managers appear to use non-GAAP reporting as a substitute for the more common reason for crash risk in prior research–withholding bad news. Moreover, we find that the association between non-GAAP disclosure and crash risk increases in periods when managers are likely more aggressive in their non-GAAP reporting. Finally, we use a regulatory shock as a quasi-natural experiment to mitigate endogeneity concerns.
主讲人简介：许尤洋，美国普度大学会计学博士、美国路易斯安那州立大学应用统计学硕士、厦门大学会计学学士，目前任香港科技大学管理学院会计系教授。研究兴趣为资本市场、公司披露、 公司治理、行为金融、分析师预测，其论文成果在Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance、The Accounting Review、Journal of Accounting and Economics、Review of Accounting Studies、Journal of Accounting Research、Contemporary Accounting Research、《经济研究》等国内外学术期刊发表。目前是美国会计学会、美国金融学会、加拿大学术会计学会和北美中国会计教授会的会员。