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“厦门大学会计学科教师与研究生系列Seminar”之五十九

发布者:刘银燕  发布时间:2019-09-19 09:59:02   点击次数:


为了活跃厦门大学会计学科的学术研究氛围,激发既有教师与在校研究生的学术研究热情和积极性,促进教师之间、教师与研究生之间、研究生彼此之间的深入交流、思想碰撞与知识分享,我们组织了由厦门大学会计学科的常任教师、博(硕)士研究生、国际访问学者等作为报告人的系列Seminar。该Seminar将冠以“厦门大学会计学科教师与研究生系列Seminar”的总标题,从2017年3月14日起,每周周二下午15:00-17:30举行。该Seminar与已有的“财务、会计Seminar”(主要聘请校外与境外的学者担任报告人) 相互补充,以期能够更好地推动厦门大学会计学科的学术发展。


   目:The Effect of Within-Outside-Director Connectedness on Their Monitoring Role: Evidence from CEO Compensation
人:申屠李融 助理教授
人: 教授
   间:2019年9月24日(星期二),15:00-17:30
   点:嘉庚二208室
论文摘要:I investigate the effect of within-outside-director connectedness (i.e., the extent to which outside directors on a same board are mutually connected) on CEO compensation. Identifying the mutual connection between outside directors based on their prior shared experience in employment, education and social activities, I measure within-outside-director connectedness by the percentage of connected pairs among all possible outside director pairs. Based on a large sample of US listed companies from 2003 to 2017, I document that within-outside-director connectedness is negatively associated with CEO compensation level, suggesting that the  mutual connections within outside directors improve their monitoring role by constraining excess pay to CEO. Moreover, equity-form compensation, is mainly affected. Meanwhile, the analysis of connection types implies education-based and social activities-based connections consistently reduce CEO pay, while effect of employment-based connection depends on the role of connected directors during the co-working experience. Additionally, it’s the mutual connection with compensation committee member involved (i.e., at least one in the connected pair is a compensation committee member) that mainly drives this compensation constraint effect. I also find that the clarity of hierarchy within connected outside directors, the connection between CEO and mutually-connected outside directors, firm corporate governance strength and CEO entrenchment power potentially alter the constraint effect.